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THE FIRST COMMAND

A REVIEW OF THE 47TH FLYING TRAINING WING OFFICER MISCONDUCT AND 19TH AIR FORCE FLYING TRAINING CULTURE

31 OCTOBER 2018

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<td>AD</td>
<td>Active Duty</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADAPT</td>
<td>Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Treatment</td>
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<td>AETC</td>
<td>Air Education and Training Command</td>
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<td>AETC Instruction</td>
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<td>AF</td>
<td>Air Force</td>
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<td>AFB</td>
<td>Air Force Base</td>
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<td>AFI</td>
<td>Air Force Instruction</td>
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<td>AFLOA</td>
<td>Air Force Legal Operations Agency</td>
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<td>Air Force Manual</td>
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<td>Air Force Medical Support Agency</td>
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<td>AFOSI</td>
<td>Air Force Office of Special Investigations</td>
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<td>AFPC</td>
<td>Air Force Personnel Center</td>
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<td>AMJAMS</td>
<td>Automated Military Justice Analysis and Management System</td>
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<td>AMR</td>
<td>Alleged Misconduct Report</td>
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<td>BOLO</td>
<td>Be On the Lookout</td>
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<td>CAF</td>
<td>Combat Air Force</td>
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<td>CC</td>
<td>Commander</td>
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<td>CCIRs</td>
<td>Commander Critical Information Requirements</td>
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<td>CDE</td>
<td>Commander-Directed Evaluation</td>
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<td>Commander Directed Investigation</td>
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<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>Vice Commander</td>
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<td>DEOCS</td>
<td>Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute Organizational Climate Survey</td>
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<td>DNIF</td>
<td>Duty Not Including/Involving Flying</td>
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<td>DO</td>
<td>Director of Operations</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DoDSER</td>
<td>DoD Suicide Event Report</td>
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<td>DUI</td>
<td>Driving Under the Influence</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>ENJJPT</td>
<td>Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training</td>
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<td>EEOC</td>
<td>US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission</td>
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<td>Equal Opportunity</td>
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<td>FAIP</td>
<td>First Assignment Instructor Pilot</td>
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<td>Flt/CC</td>
<td>Flight Commander</td>
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<td>FSS</td>
<td>Force Support Squadron</td>
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<td>FTG</td>
<td>Flying Training Group</td>
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<td>Flying Training Squadron</td>
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<td>FTW</td>
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<td>HIL</td>
<td>High Interest List</td>
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<td>IP</td>
<td>Instructor Pilot</td>
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<td>JA</td>
<td>Judge Advocate</td>
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<td>JAG</td>
<td>Judge Advocate General</td>
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<td>JBSA</td>
<td>Joint Base San Antonio</td>
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<td>Letter of Admonishment</td>
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<td>MAJCOM</td>
<td>Major Command</td>
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<td>MASS</td>
<td>Merit Assignment Selection System</td>
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<td>MDG</td>
<td>Medical Group</td>
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<td>MH</td>
<td>Mental Health</td>
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<td>MHP</td>
<td>Mental Health Provider</td>
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<td>MTI</td>
<td>Military Training Instructor</td>
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<td>MTL</td>
<td>Military Training Leader</td>
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<td>NAF</td>
<td>Numbered Air Force</td>
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<td>NAS</td>
<td>Naval Air Station</td>
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<td>NJP</td>
<td>Nonjudicial Punishment</td>
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<td>OG</td>
<td>Operations Group</td>
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<td>Officer Performance Report</td>
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<td>Operational Reporting</td>
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<td>OSR</td>
<td>Officer Selection Record</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>PIF</td>
<td>Personnel Information File</td>
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<td>Pilot Instructor Training</td>
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<td>PRF</td>
<td>Promotion Recommendation File</td>
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<td>TDY</td>
<td>Temporary Duty</td>
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<td>TMT</td>
<td>Task Management Tool</td>
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<td>RFR</td>
<td>Right of First Refusal</td>
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<td>Remotely Piloted Aircraft</td>
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<td>SAMMC</td>
<td>San Antonio Military Medical Center</td>
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<td>SERE</td>
<td>Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape</td>
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<td>SKIWeb</td>
<td>Strategic Knowledge Integration Web</td>
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<td>SOD</td>
<td>Status of Discipline</td>
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<td>SUPT</td>
<td>Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>UCC</td>
<td>Unit Command Center</td>
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<td>UCI</td>
<td>Unlawful Command Influence</td>
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<td>UCMJ</td>
<td>Uniform Code of Military Justice</td>
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<td>UIF</td>
<td>Unfavorable Information File</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>USAF</td>
<td>United States Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>URT</td>
<td>Undergraduate Remotely Piloted Aircraft Training</td>
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<td>USAFA</td>
<td>United States Air Force Academy</td>
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<td>vPC</td>
<td>Virtual Personnel Center</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On 10 September 2018, Lieutenant General Steven Kwast, Commander, Air Education and Training Command (AETC), commissioned an independent Commander Directed Investigation (CDI) into the causes and circumstances of recent officer misconduct at the 47th Flying Training Wing (47 FTW), Laughlin Air Force Base (AFB), Texas, to include: the organization and training culture; leadership environment and oversight (47 FTW and 19th Air Force); barriers to reporting by students and instructors; and institutional policies and safeguards. The events discussed in the report occurred between February 2017 and September 2018. This report provides the results of that investigation.

The CDI team was tasked to provide thorough responses to tasks listed in Attachment A and provide findings and recommendations, to include any other actions the command should take. Recommendations by the CDI team must be designed to be enduring and sustainable.

Methodology

Investigators collected data using interviews, site visits, focus groups, surveys, analysis of case-specific material, and a review of existing academic literature.

Interviews, Site Visits and Focus Groups

Over the CDI’s duration, investigators visited six bases across 19th Air Force (19 AF);
Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training (SUPT) at the 47 FTW (Laughlin AFB, Texas), 71 FTW (Vance AFB, Oklahoma), and 14 FTW (Columbus AFB, Mississippi); Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training (ENJJPT) at the 80 FTW (Sheppard AFB, Texas); Combat Systems Officer (CSO) Training at the 479th Flying Training Group (FTG) (Pensacola Naval Air Station (NAS), Florida); and Pilot Instructor Training (PIT) and Undergraduate Remotely Piloted Aircraft Training (URT) at the 12 FTW (Joint Base San Antonio (JBSA)-Randolph, Texas).

Five group-leadership discussions were held at Sheppard AFB, Vance AFB, Columbus AFB, Pensacola NAS, and JBSA-Randolph, with 126 total personnel. Group sessions were composed of wing leadership, group commanders, squadron commanders and flight commanders. Additionally, to better understand the environment and culture within the 47 FTW, three focus groups with a total of 27 enlisted personnel were held at Laughlin AFB.

Additionally, the CDI team conducted 18 focus groups; 9 with instructor pilots (IPs) and 9 with student pilots across select 19 AF bases. The average size of each focus group was 12 people, and instructors and students were not interviewed together. During the focus groups, the CDI team interviewed a total of 213 people, comprised of 104 instructors (49%) and 109 students (51%). Broken down by demographics, the IPs were comprised of 41 women (39%) and 63 men (61%), while the students were comprised of 53 women (49%) and 56 men (51%). Since the CDI directed a close look at the training culture in the 47 FTW, six sessions (three student and three instructor) were conducted at Laughlin AFB, while only two sessions (one student and one instructor session) were conducted at Columbus AFB, Vance AFB, and Sheppard AFB. Due to the diversity of mission sets in the 12 FTW, six total sessions were conducted: four sessions (two student and two

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1 When “Sheppard AFB” is referred to in the report, the CDI team is specifically addressing the 80 FTW.
2 When “Pensacola NAS” is referred to in the report, the CDI team is specifically addressing the 479 TRG.
3 When “JBSA-Randolph” is referred to in the report, the CDI team is specifically addressing the 12 FTW, minus the 479 TRG at Pensacola NAS.
instructor) at JBSA-Randolph and two (one student and one instructor) were conducted at Pensacola NAS.

The focus groups employed structured interview questions and guided discussion. During the focus group, the attendees also filled out questionnaires related to the safety climate and flight commander leadership behaviors.

![Focus Group Demographics](image)

**Figure 1. Focus Group Demographics**

Surveys

The Study Team constructed and executed a four-minute survey to contribute a quantitative perspective to the focus groups and interviews for CDI Task 2. The team collected data from 17 September 2018, to 24 September 2018, using a survey consisting of demographics, Likert-type response, and Yes/No response items on the dimensions related to a hostile workplace for women (sexual harassment, discrimination, unwanted workplace experiences, and perceptions of prevention and reporting) and dimensions related to toxic leadership (authoritarian supervision, abusive supervision, unpredictability, self-promoting, hazing, bullying). The goal of this analysis was to determine an overall impression on these dimensions, to make inferences about the populations of the 47 FTW and 19 AF as a whole, and to compare 47 FTW to other 19 AF wings.
Additionally, the team sought to detect differences between genders and roles (instructor and student) within the 19 AF, to support CDI findings and recommendations.

**Case Specific Material**

A detailed review of available law enforcement investigative material was undertaken, to include detailed interviews and law enforcement reports related to each of the specific cases that led to this investigation. While most case-specific material is protected by the Privacy Act and is not available to the public, an extensive bibliography of releasable or publically available material is included in the report.

**Literature Review**

Investigators reviewed relevant policy, recent government studies and academic literature. In many instances, the information guided the development and design of interview and survey questions. It also assisted the team in understanding the history and psychological basis for misconduct.

**Findings and Recommendations**

The investigation examined flying training at the 47 FTW to establish the causal chain associated with recent officer misconduct that gave rise to lapses in good order and discipline. The root cause of the officer misconduct was leadership improperly assessing the environment and missing opportunities to establish a culture of dignity and respect.
Organizational Factors: Organizational factors that contributed to the misconduct centered on [b] (7)(A), [b] (7)(C). The pressure to produce aviators was felt acutely at the wing, group, squadron, and flight leadership level. The drive to produce pilots while overcoming challenging and significant operational obstacles created a perception there was limited bandwidth for professional development and mentorship. Focus group discussions confirmed the command’s emphasis on pilot production, which hindered leadership’s ability to capitalize on critical opportunities to mentor at the wing, group, and squadron levels.

Unsafe Supervision: Unsafe supervision also contributed to the alleged officer misconduct. First, there was lack of understanding by leaders when action needed to be taken to correct an unsafe situation. Second, unsafe supervision occurred when leaders did not apply non-punitive actions to prevent further escalation of alcohol related incidences and rehabilitate our Airmen (e.g., Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Treatment or Mental Health). It was especially noted in two cases; at the piano burning ceremony outside the Combined Club and at the naming ceremony, leaders at the squadron, group, and wing level chose not to immediately correct unprofessional and unsafe situations. The lack of leadership intervention created the false perception that the Air Force condoned values that did not promote dignity and respect. The misperception stemmed from a belief that certain Air Force traditions, although out-of-alignment with our core values, are still valued in the flying community.

Precondition: The precondition that contributed to the officer misconduct was an underlying feeling that over-consumption of alcohol was part of our Air Force heritage that only
demanded mitigation vice correction. An example of the behavior is utilizing a designated driver program to mitigate over-consumption of alcohol.

**Active Conditions:** Finally, active conditions that contributed to the officer misconduct were two-fold. First, absence of wing leadership due to flying upgrade, and command training that was accomplished post change of command. For the first six months, 47 FTW/CC was scheduled for 135 days of TDY (73% of his first six months, with his PIT course at JBSA-Randolph, comprising 128 days). The lack of wing command presence at home station did not allow the wing commander to clearly set expectations, learn about the challenges and opportunities in the 47 FTW by establishing relationships with the leadership team, or develop an understanding of the culture at the 47 FTW. The second active condition was a misinterpretation of Air Force policy of revitalizing our squadrons and pushing down authority. On multiple occasions leadership in the 47 FTW inappropriately abdicated authority. The abdication was both a lack of awareness when leaders should act and a misunderstanding of authorities and delegation of authorities.

In summary, the assessment by the CDI team asserts that foundational formal training should embody and set the tone for our Air Force culture. Instructors at initial formal training have a significant power delta over students. If not handled properly and professionally, young Airmen will leave their initial training with an improper footing on Air Force core values. Leaders who train our next generation of Airmen must ensure that the training environment is infused with a culture of dignity and respect that promotes an atmosphere of learning and coaching.
BACKGROUND

This report covers events involving officer misconduct that occurred at the 47 FTW at Laughlin AFB located in Del Rio, Texas, primarily between July 2016 and September 2018. The 47 FTW is one of three SUPT wings in the United States Air Force. Its primary mission is to conduct specialized undergraduate pilot training for the United States Air Force, Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard and allied nation’s air forces utilizing the T-6, T-38 and T-1A trainer aircraft. Under the 47 FTW, there are three groups: the 47th Operations Group (47 OG), 47th Mission Support Group (47 MSG), and the 47th Medical Group (47 MDG). The officers involved in the misconduct came from the 47 OG and were all Instructor Pilots (IP) in the 87th Flying Training Squadron (87 FTS), which is one of six squadrons under the 47 OG. The 87 FTS instructs students who have completed academic/ground training and primary flying training in the T-6. Students assigned to the 87 FTS complete Advanced Flying Training in the T-38 and upon graduation are generally tracked toward a fighter or bomber aircraft.

The 47 FTW falls under 19 AF, headquartered at JBSA-Randolph, Texas. 19 AF oversees 12 major units, including 11 wings and a major training groups. It is responsible for training aircrews, remotely piloted aircraft crews, air battle managers, weapons directors, United Stated Air Force Academy (USAFA) Airmanship programs, and Survival, Escape, Resistance, and
Evasion (SERE) specialists. Nineteenth Air Force falls under Air Education and Training Command (AETC), also headquartered at JBSA-Randolph, Texas, which is responsible for recruiting, training and educating Airman to deliver 21st century airpower.
"I BELIEVE IT IS AT THE SQUADRON LEVEL WHERE WE SUCCEED OR FAIL AS AN AIR FORCE."

GEN. DAVID GOLDFEIN
“TRUST YOUR GUT. YOU WILL BE CHOSEN FOR COMMAND LIKE YOU WERE CHOSEN FOR THIS SCHOOL - WE TRUST YOU,”

GEN. DAVID GOLDFEIN SAID.
4 SEP 18 ADDRESS AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE STUDENTS
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CDI TASK 2A

Assess the training culture and environment within the 47 FTW and across 19 AF to determine if it promotes a culture of dignity and respect. Specifically, assess whether a training environment hostile to women exists and whether the command chain failed to prevent it.

According to AFI 1-2, Commander’s Responsibilities, “commanders will establish and maintain a healthy command climate which fosters good order and discipline, teamwork, cohesion and trust. A healthy climate ensures members are treated with dignity, respect, and inclusion, and does not tolerate harassment, assault, or unlawful discrimination of any kind.” The Commander Directed Investigation (CDI) team used a combination of focus groups, interviews and surveys to collect data in this area.

Overview

The CDI team utilized a multi-prong approach to assess the training culture, to include:

1) focus groups and individual interviews with student pilots, instructor pilots and flight commanders; 2) over 1,000 online surveys completed by students and instructors across 19 AF; 3) a review of 19 AF wing Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute Organizational Climate Survey (DEOCS) and Equal Opportunity (EO) data; 4) observation of the flying training environment at multiple bases; and 5) no-notice visual inspection of work areas. After compiling
and reviewing the data, it was determined that the overall training environment across 19 AF wings was **not** hostile to women. The perception of a positive and respectful work environment from students and instructors alike, far outweighed the examples of unprofessionalism. However, during the course of the investigation, the CDI team discovered there are some habits of thought and practices that detract from a culture of dignity and respect.

**Gender Demographics**

Before addressing the question at hand, the CDI team reviewed the relative demographics of women in the US population, in the military, in the Active Duty Air Force (AD USAF), and in the AD USAF pilot community. This review served to illustrate the relative small population of women in the USAF pilot force as compared to US population demographics and AD military/USAF population demographics.

The total US population is made up of 51% women and 49% men.\(^\text{220}\) In the Active Duty (AD) military, across all services, there are 19% women and 81% percent men.\(^\text{221}\) The AD USAF is comprised of 20% women and 80% men; the officer force consists of 21% women and the enlisted force consists of 20% women. The AD USAF pilot community is comprised of 6% women and 94% men.


Demographic data drawn from the Air Force Personnel Center in September 2018, shows the percentage of women pilots in the grade of O-2 (1st Lieutenant) is the highest at 9.4%, with a decrease in percentage at each grade, bottoming out at the General Officer average of 3.6% women. A comparison between women pilots in the AD USAF and in AETC by grade is illustrated below.

Across 19AF, there is a varied female representation of pilots and instructor pilots at the training wings. The traditional Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training (SUPT) bases (Laughlin AFB, Columbus AFB, and Vance AFB) are above the AETC average for women pilots, whereas...
Sheppard AFB, Eglin AFB and Luke AFB are well below the AETC average (Figure 4). Generally speaking, the bases with the lowest percentage of women pilots conduct fighter/bomber training. The wings that conduct training for mobility assets (Little Rock AFB and Altus AFB) also have low percentages and total number of female pilots as compared to the AD USAF and AETC.

Figure 4. Percentage of AD Women Pilots and Instructors Pilots in 19 AF Flying Training Wings
In the 47 FTW at Laughlin AFB, 6.6% of the instructor pilot population and 10% of the student pilot populations are women.
Survey Methodology

Given the context of the survey effort, the team sought to design a survey that would address the core elements of the task, require very little response time on the part of instructors and students, and support analysis of important subgroups. The survey used the “attitude,” or Likert Scale format, which was mapped to numerical values as follows: 1= Strongly Disagree/Never, 2= Disagree/Rarely, 3= Neutral/Sometimes, 4= Agree/Often, and 5= Strongly Agree/Always. In all questions, the more “desired” response yielded a lower score.

Discrimination

Adapted from DEOCS, students rated 4 items on a five-point Likert scale (1= Strongly Disagree to 5= Strongly Agree) regarding various discriminatory behaviors. Higher scores

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222 See Appendix H for a full list of survey questions.
reflected higher accounts of discrimination. Separately instructors were asked to rate 6 items on a 5-point Likert scale in regards to various discriminatory behavior found amongst students (e.g., sexist slurs, comments, and/or jokes used amongst students).

Sexual Harassment

One item was adapted from DEOCS that directly measured egregious behavior of sexual harassment; “Individuals from my workplace have been offered rewards or special treatment in return for engaging in sexual behavior.” Participants responded on a 5-point Likert scale from 1= Strongly Disagree to 5= Strongly Agree. Those with higher scores indicated higher encounters of sexual harassment.

Reporting/Preventing Mistreatment

It is important to characterize unit culture along a spectrum of mistreatment severity for two reasons. First, environments permissive of mistreatment have been linked to a host of

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223 Harassment: According to AFI 36-2706, Equal Opportunity Program Military and Civilian, there is Zero Tolerance for harassment. It says, “Unlawful harassment also includes creating an intimidating, hostile working environment for another person on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, disability, reprisal, or genetic information. The use of disparaging terms with respect to a person’s race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, disability, or genetic information contributes to a hostile work environment and must not be tolerated.” The concept of hostile work environment is embedded in the USAF definition of harassment.

224 Sex-based Harassment (or Sex Discrimination): A differentiation should be made between sexual harassment and sex based or gender-based harassment (called sex discrimination in the USAF) (Fitzgerald & Drasgor, 1997). Sex-based harassment focuses on gender more than sexual desire. Sex-based harassment is defined as “a broad range of verbal and nonverbal behaviors not aimed at sexual cooperation but that convey insulting, hostile, and degrading attitudes about women.” (Fitzgerald & Drasgor, 1997) Sexist jokes, crude behavior and derogatory terms of address are all forms of sex-based harassment.
unfavorable workplace outcomes, including sexual assault and discrimination.\textsuperscript{225} Secondly, mistreatment in a training context may impede learning and contributes to intentions to quit.\textsuperscript{226} As previously discussed, incivility and sexual harassment are two forms of mistreatment, but other forms, such as hazing, bullying, and physical violence can also be arrayed on a continuum from mild to severe, and may differentially affect women.\textsuperscript{227} All of these forms would be considered antithetical to a culture of dignity and respect.

Adapted from DEOCS and an item from Minor-Rubino and Cortina’s (2007) scale,\textsuperscript{228} participants rated four items on a five-point scale (1= Strongly Disagree to 5= Strongly Agree). Items reflect whether members feel safe reporting behaviors including sexual harassment, discrimination, and concerns about hostility. Scores were reversed (1 to 5, 5 to 1, etc.) for consistency with other results, therefore lower scores reflected members feeling more confident in being able to report such behaviors within their chain of command and that their chain of command actively prevented mistreatment.

Unwanted Workplace Experiences

Adapted from DEOCS, participants responded to three items indicating whether they observed particular behaviors that were unwanted in the training environment (e.g., repeatedly tell sexual “jokes” that made you uncomfortable, angry, or upset?).\textsuperscript{229}


\textsuperscript{229} Refer to Appendix H-CDI Survey Analysis Final, Appendix M for the list of questions.
Bullying

One question from DEOCS measured which types of bullying an individual may have experienced in training (e.g., abusive or malicious pranks). Participants could select as many categories as needed from those listed.

Analysis

Survey Results

Observed Hostility Score. Overall, students and instructors across 19 AF did not have perceptions of a hostile environment for women. Average scores for the perception of Observed Hostility and Discrimination fell between 1 (Never/Rarely) and 2 (Strongly Disagree/Disagree). Students of the 47 FTW, Laughlin Air Force Base, showed a slightly worse Observed Hostility score when compared to 19 AF overall and several other wings. However, their scores still fell between 1 (Never/Rarely) and 2 (Strongly Disagree/Disagree); in the acceptable range. Instructors

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230 Bullying is defined as abuse and mistreatment of someone vulnerable by someone stronger, more powerful, etc. The abuse and mistreatment is generally targeted at a person (or group) who is seen as different through acts of aggression, abusive or malicious pranks, active attempts to damage reputation, physical harm, and/or psychological harm. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bullying.

231 Reference Appendix H of CDI Report. Hostile Work Environment is a phrase used in United States labor law to describe an environment in which a member finds it difficult or impossible to work due to discriminatory conditions (EEOC, 2018). When establishing a burden of proof that a hostile work environment exists, experts consider four dimensions that provide a useful framework for the CDI assessment (to be clear, the analysis described here is not meant to establish a burden of proof, but provide indicators to the CDI team using a commonly accepted framework for hostile workplace). The behaviors or conditions are discriminatory (targeting a protected group – in this context, women), pervasive (persists over time), severe (disrupts the members’ work) and unwelcome (the behavior persists after the member indicates that the behavior is unwelcome) (EEOC, 2018).

232 The Observed Hostility Scale was adapted from Minor-Rubino and Cortina’s scale, which describes incivility and harassment in educational contexts (e.g., speaks in a condescending or patronizing manner to a student/employee). These items were preceded with the following instructions: “In your current training, have you observed any instructor and/or administrator...” The wording was changed in the question to broaden the target from “a female employee” to “student/employee” and reduced the number of questions in order to avoid redundancy as some of the questions would be covered by other questions in the study. Participants responded to a 5-point Likert scale, 1= Strongly Disagree to 5= Strongly Agree, with higher scores reflecting higher levels of observed hostility.
of the 47 FTW also reported higher perceptions of discriminatory behavior among students.\textsuperscript{233} Additionally, across 19 AF, females reported worse attitude scores than males in the categories of Observed Hostility, Discrimination (as rated by students) and Discrimination Among Students (as rated by instructors), but these scores still fell within the range of 1 (Never/Rarely) and 2 (Strongly Disagree/Disagree). Eight females (15.1\%) and 32 males (7.4\%) reported discrimination by instructors that were negative (a scale score over 3). Finally, across 19 AF, students reported worse attitudes than instructors on Observed Hostility (mean difference of 0.15 on a 5 point scale). Focus group survey’s largely replicated the results of the online survey.

\textbf{Bullying.} Across surveyed units, the percentages of surveys indicating bullying ranged from 0\% to 10.2\%. At 47 FTW, 10.2\% of surveys indicated there was some form of bullying (at least one form of bullying selected from a list), which was the highest percentage among 10 surveyed units.\textsuperscript{234} At Sheppard AFB, 7.6\% of surveys indicated there was some form of bullying in the 80 FTW.

\section*{Focus Groups and Individual Interviews}

The CDI team visited the aforementioned bases to conduct focus groups, interviews, and visual inspection of the flying training environment. Overall, the focus groups and individual interviews revealed that instructors and students in the flying trying

\textsuperscript{233} 47 FTW score was 5\% above neutral, the highest of surveyed bases, but still between 1 (Never/Rarely) and 2 (Strongly Disagree/Disagree).
\textsuperscript{234} In the 47 FTW, there were 20 reported accounts of bullying identified in 10 total surveys (respondents could selected multiple types of bullying in one answer).
environment felt it was a professional environment that fostered a culture of dignity and respect. There was an overwhelming positive perception about the students and instructors flying training experience, their respect for their leadership, and their personal belief that they would personally stand up if they saw unprofessional behavior. It was noteworthy that units that made a concerted effort to make student milestone celebrations and unit events a family affair, had less reported incidents of unprofessional behavior and over-consumption of alcohol.

The CDI discovered information suggesting that mistreatment may have occurred at the unit of interest within the 47 FTW, enacted by specific instructors against students. Focus groups and interviews provided additional samples of behavior by instructors and flight commanders at that unit and additional training units. These situations ranged from what Anderson and Pearson\textsuperscript{235} characterize as \textit{incivility}, low intensity deviant behavior of ambiguous intent, to more blatant examples of \textit{sexual harassment}, unwanted sex-related behavior appraised as unwelcome by the recipient.\textsuperscript{236}

On the continuum of mistreatment of women in the training environment, acts of benevolent sexism, gender (or social) policing and micro-aggressions were noted during the focus group discussions across 19 AF. Incidents of these types do not rise to the level of “hostility” because, despite the


presence of these behaviors at all locations, they did not result in a situation where the interviewed women found it “difficult or impossible to work due to discriminatory conditions” in their military units. However, the presence of these behaviors are an indication that there is still work to be done to address and correct unprofessional behaviors.

**Benevolent Sexism.** Benevolent and hostile sexism are two dimensions of ambivalent sexism, or sexism that is based on traditional verses egalitarian view of women’s roles, and the positive or negative opinions of female traits. Hostile sexism is sexism targeted at women based on negative characterizations of women, whereas benevolent sexism involves positive characterizations of women.\textsuperscript{237} Women are harmed by benevolent sexism in that, in an environment in which they endeavor to be peers and equals with their male counterparts, their perceived gender-based differences are highlighted. The presence of this type of sexism was observed in the Civilian Simulator Instructors (as will be discussed below) in describing how female pilots fly aircraft better due to their gender.

**Gender Policing.**\textsuperscript{238} Social re-categorization was a common theme among discussions with female pilots. The use of the phrase “bro culture,” as articulated by men and women, was prevalent in the 47 FTW as a description of a team that takes care of one another.


\textsuperscript{238} Social (or gender) policing is the imposition or enforcement of normative gender expressions on an individual who is perceived as not adequately performing, through appearance or behavior, the sex that was assigned to them at birth (see gender performativity). Gender policing serves to devalue or delegitimize expressions that deviate from normative conceptions of gender, thus reinforcing the gender binary. The result is gender non-conformity harassment, which expresses condemnation and hostility towards those who violate normative gender expectations. Gender non-conformity harassment may be present due to the belief that a women should not do “masculine” work (Leskinen, E.A., & Cortina, L.M (2013) Dimensions of Disrespect: Mapping and Measuring Gender Harassment in Organizations, Psychology of Women Quarterly, http://pwq.sagepub.com/, 21 August 2013). Alternatively, male-dominated work environments are more likely to prescribe to the view that women should adapt and conform to masculine norms in order to succeed at. In order to conform, some women will engage in social re-categorization by distancing themselves from femininity and other women in their workplace (Banchefsk, S. Park, B., (2017) Negative gender ideologies and gender-science stereotypes are more pervasive in male-dominated academic disciplines, Social Sciences, https://www.mdpi.com/2076-0760/7/2/27)
Gender Micro-Aggressions.\textsuperscript{239} In the context of flight training, expressing surprise at how well a woman performed a maneuver due to the belief that women are not well-suited for flying, or instructing a women with more intensity than her male counterparts who are performing at the same level were examples of micro-aggressions that were reported at focus groups and during interviews. Additionally micro-aggressions were found in songs used during unit-sponsored celebrations, the hesitation/apprehension of some instructors to fly with female students, or male-centric language to describe team comradery. Over time, micro-aggressions can lead to increased anxiety, stress, and depression, affecting a person’s overall psychological well-being.\textsuperscript{240}

The Importance of Leadership Action. The cases of unprofessionalism discovered in focus groups and interviews were rare, and, in many cases, the incidents were appropriately handled by the chain of command. IPs discussed situations where squadron commanders intervened immediately when confronted with a situation where a subordinate utilized unprofessional language. However, the CDI revealed that there were cases where flight, squadron, group and/or wing leadership were present during unprofessional acts, and they either participated, watched and did nothing, or simply left the room so they would not “be part of it.” Even if uncommon, the effects of unprofessional behavior within a unit, have enduring effects that

\textsuperscript{239} Micro-aggressions are brief, everyday exchanges that derogate individuals for their membership in a social category. These exchanges can be verbal, behavioral, or environmental. Micro-aggressions do not have to be targeted or aggressive, and are typically subtle and ambiguous in nature. The target and the aggressor sometimes do not recognize the exchanges as demeaning in nature.

detract from the overall unit cohesiveness and degrade mission effectiveness.

**Reporting Mechanisms.** During the focus groups, there was a perception by instructors that students or other instructors who had an issue with the professionalism of another person would not hesitate to use the open door policy to report inappropriate behavior. Although there were several example of students bringing issues up to instructors and flight commanders, there were also students who did not want the distraction, scrutiny, or possible social-outing that comes with reporting misbehavior. Instructors and flight commanders did not have an accurate perception of student’s willingness to use the open door. The reliance on an open door policy puts the onus of reporting on the target or witness. Instead, a concerted focus on the obligation for teammates and leaders to step in when derogatory, harassing or discriminatory language should be used. This takes bold leadership and a clear understanding of what professionalism means.241

Also, 19 AF wings did not have a standard tool or mechanism for their students to provide mid-course feedback. Units that had thorough, formalized and transparent processes for mid-term feedback tended to self-police in terms of instructor quality and conduct. Relying only on end-of-course feedback does not allow the squadron or flight commander to make corrections to professionalism or quality of instruction during the execution of the course.

**No-Notice Visual Inspection of Squadron Areas**

A visual inspection (walk through) of the flying training squadrons at each base found that the training areas and heritage rooms (squadron bar) were free from degrading, demeaning or unprofessional items. Furthermore, the CDI team did not hear the use of profane or unprofessional

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241The USAF Profession of Arms Center of Excellence (PACE) defines professionalism as “the art of leading oneself.” Professionalism is built on a foundation of trust, loyalty and commitment.
language during their no-notice visual inspection or time in flight rooms. Observed flight debriefings were conducted in a thorough and professional manner.

**Equality Opportunity (EO) Database**

A review of all military and civilian Equality Opportunity (EO) complaints across AETC showed 34 formal and 137 informal complaints made across the command between 2013 and 2018. Three of these complaints were from the flying training squadrons. There were program gaps in the data that the EO office could not account for. It was difficult to ascertain the reliability of the information pulled from the database due to a system migration in 2016, data entry errors, and potential gaps in EO reporting.

**Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute Organizational Climate Survey (DEOCS)**

A review of DEOCS in the 47 FTW flying training squadrons and operational groups across 19 AF for 2018 revealed that all units are near or above the service average for favorable climate related to discrimination. The CDI team found that, neither the DEOCS nor an equivalent instrument is routinely administered to students of training units in the command. As a consequence, unit DEOCS reports do not necessarily reflect the perceptions of students about the policies, practices, and procedures that would ensure a positive environment. Since subgroups within an organization can—and often do—have very different views of culture and climate, climate DEOCS responses from students could better inform the characterization of the culture of the units of interest.

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Unprofessionalism in the Simulator Environment.

Although not an initial focus of the CDI, a pattern of unprofessional behavior in Civilian Simulator Instructors (CSI) was brought to the attention of investigators during interviews and focus groups. First, it is important to note that, at each location, students and instructors also remarked that there were mostly high-quality and professional CSIs. Instructors and students were clear that the offending CSIs were in the minority; at each location, approximately one to four CSIs were highlighted in interviews as exhibiting unprofessional behavior. Also during focus groups and interviews, the CDI interviewers could discern that multiple students and instructors were referring to the same few CSIs.

Focus groups and interviews revealed an environment of hostility and toxic leadership exists amongst a few specific simulator cadre at Laughlin AFB. Students and instructors relayed it was difficult to work due to discriminatory conditions (the sim sessions were unproductive), that is was pervasive (has been present for years), occasionally severe (disruptive to productive learning) and unwelcome (corrections have not changed behavior). Although the comments were most significant at Laughlin AFB, there were also indications that similar unprofessional remarks were made by CSIs at the 71 FTW (Vance AFB), 14 FTW (Columbus AFB), and 479 OG (Pensacola NAS). CSI quality and behavior (positive and negative) was discussed by 30 students and instructors during focus groups (some students made multiple characterizations of CSI behavior). There were 18 mentions of sex-based negative behaviors that included sexual harassment, micro-aggressions, hostile sexism, benevolent sexism, and non-conformity harassment.
Ten of these 18 descriptions of sex-based derogatory remarks by CSIs were highlighted by student pilots at Laughlin AFB. Additionally, there were 15 mentions of CSIs acting in an unprofessional manner or instructing in a way that was not tactically sound. During the student focus group session at Vance AFB, when asked, by a show of hands, which student had experienced issues with a CSI, all 12 members of the session raised their hands (the show-of-hands was not included in the tally of comments made about CSIs). The issues with the professionalism of CSIs was confirmed during leadership interviews at several locations. At the 14 FTW (Columbus AFB) wing, group and squadron leadership were aware of issues with CSIs. At the 71 FTW (Vance AFB) group, squadron, and flight leaders were aware, and at Pensacola NAS, the group commander was aware. There was a belief among instructors and students that CSIs are untouchable, there is no choice but to put up with their behavior because firing a civilian is impossible, and there is reluctance to hold them accountable due to CSI manning shortages.

Nonetheless, in May 2018, at Laughlin AFB, there was a substantiated CDI that resulted in the removal of one CSI and disciplinary action in the form of verbal counseling of three more (discipline was initiated prior to that CDI). The allegations included gender discrimination towards female student pilots and a hostile work environment. Instructors and students at Laughlin AFB were also aware that a previous CDI was conducted and substantiated. Despite these actions, another T-6 CSI was mentioned by name repeatedly during the CDI’s focus groups and individual interviews who was not included in the May 2018 CDI. The cases of gender discrimination and sexual harassment in two separate CDIs at the 47 FTW (one on CSIs and one on simulator maintainers) were not reported or recorded in the 47 FTW EO database. The substantiated CDI on the CSIs did not result in Alleged Misconduct Reporting (AMR) to 19 AF.
Findings

The CDI team did not find a training environment hostile to women across 19 AF. In fact, focus groups and interviews revealed that male and female students and instructors thought their environment promotes a culture of dignity and respect, and female students and instructors felt respected and included as a member of their units. However, there were many examples and incidents of unprofessionalism and low-level hostility that, when uncorrected by leadership, degraded mission effectiveness and overall unit cohesiveness. The CDI team found anecdotal examples of gender and race based-harassment that is contrary to good order and discipline. In particular, there are probably 2 to 4 CSIs at the 47 FTW at Laughlin AFB who breed a hostile work environment during simulator training. Furthermore, there were also indications of CSI unprofessionalism at Vance AFB, Columbus AFB and Pensacola NAS; CSIs were reported as making disparaging and degrading remarks to students, in some cases, targeting women. Due to the power disparity and competitiveness of the environment, some students are unwilling to report misbehavior for fear it would affect their training, the team dynamic within their flight, or their flight ranking.

Furthermore, 19 AF wings do not have robust anonymous feedback mechanisms. Anonymous feedback allows students and instructors to provide input to leadership on what is going on as well as and what needs improvement. It also gives assigned personnel a mechanism to report unprofessionalism/misconduct openly or anonymously. Finally, the use of mid-term
feedback from students across 19 AF wings is inconsistent. Units that had thorough, formalized and transparent processes for student and instructor mid-term feedback tended to better self-police in terms of instructor quality and officer conduct.
Assess the training culture and environment within the 47 FTW and across 19 AF to determine if it promotes a culture of dignity and respect. Specifically, assess whether a culture of toxic leadership exists and whether the command chain failed to prevent it.

Overview

Toxic leadership has been variously defined by researchers. The US Army characterized the dimensions of toxic leadership through large scale survey research in 2009, to include self-serving, anti-subordinate, and micro-managing behaviors. In that study, both military and civilian respondents characterized toxic leadership in the same way, and no differences were found in the perceptions of the prevalence of toxic leadership by gender, ethnicity, or component (active, guard, reserve). In the 2010 Annual Survey of Army Leadership, 18-19% of respondents indicated that their supervisor “does things and behaves in a way that is positive for the organization and themselves, but negative for subordinates.” In a separate analysis using a set of toxic leadership behaviors, researchers found that 11% of Army supervisors (as perceived by subordinates) could be characterized as toxic, receiving a scale score of greater than 3.5, which is .5 above neutral, on a 5 point scale.

In 2008, Schmidt derived five dimensions of toxic leadership from military and civilian sources: abusive supervision, authoritarian leadership, narcissism, self-promotion, and

245 R. Riley, personal communication, April 2014.
unpredictability. While the behaviors of toxic leaders may overlap with those described in the EEOC definition of a hostile work environment, the targets of toxic leadership are subordinates (formal and informal) and toxic leadership includes a self-promotion element. Importantly, toxic leaders can and often are personally high-performing. Yet they engage in behaviors that have consequences for subordinates as well as for overall unit morale and climate. For the purposes of this analysis, a person is considered in a position of leadership if he or she has the authority and power to direct the actions of others, and therefore includes instructors in their relationship to students.

The following scales were used in focus group and online surveys. Items are listed in the September 2018 Analysis for Commander’s Directed Investigation at 47 FTW, Laughlin AFB, found in Appendix H of this report.

**Survey Methodology**

**Toxic Leadership Scale – Supervisors**

Both students and instructors were asked to complete a reduced version of Schmidt’s toxic leadership scale containing the dimensions of Self-Promotion, Abusive Supervision, Authoritarian Leadership, and Unpredictability. Participants responded to a 5-point Likert scale, 1= Never to 5= Always. Based on focus group responses, item 8 was modified to lead with ‘negatively’, as some students felt, without that word, the item could be framed in a positive way.

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Toxic Leadership Scale – Instructors

Students were asked to complete the scale again, with the ‘least effective instructor’ as the target of the evaluation. This framing was chosen as a consequence of the CDI focus on instructor behavior, and to encourage the student to provide evaluations with a specific person in mind, instead of providing a generalized sentiment.

Analysis

Survey Results

The purpose of the survey was to provide the CDI team quantitative feedback from instructors and students of the 19 AF on a culture of dignity and respect in the area of toxic leadership. Overall, students and instructors across 19 AF did not have perceptions of a toxic leadership (average scores between 1 and 2 – never/rarely, and strongly disagree/disagree). The 47 FTW had the fourth highest average supervisor toxic leadership response score among 10 units surveyed. Of the surveys collected, 0.5% were above a neutral. Responses by gender indicated no significant difference for supervisor toxic leadership and instructor toxic leadership. Also, there was no significant difference in the responses by role as instructor or student.

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249 September 2018 Analysis for CDI at 47 FTW, Laughlin AFB in Appendix H of this report, see Figure 3 and Table 5.
250 September 2018 Analysis for CDI at 47 FTW, Laughlin AFB in Appendix H of this report, see Table 9.
251 September 2018 Analysis for CDI at 47 FTW, Laughlin AFB in Appendix H of this report, see Table 10.
DEOMI Organizational Climate Survey (DEOCS)/Unit Effectiveness Inspection Data

In the 47 FTW 2018 DEOCS Report, questions that related to positive leadership climate (opposite of toxic leadership) were 1) I can rely on my immediate supervisor to act in my organization's best interest, 2) my immediate supervisor follows through with commitments he or she makes, 3) I feel comfortable sharing my work difficulties with my immediate supervisor, and 4) my immediate supervisor treats me fairly. The leadership at the 47 FTW earned an 83% favorable response for the above questions. Comments throughout the 2018 DEOCS survey indicates that the leadership is not toxic within the 47 FTW for the permanent party at Laughlin.

Focus group surveys and discussions, and individual interviews replicated the results of the online survey indicating 47 FTW and 19 AF leadership. Focus group discussions and CDI team member visits to flying training squadrons indicated that generally squadron leadership at all 19 AF wings the team visited were engaged and promoted a culture of dignity and respect.

Conclusion

One of the Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of Staff of the Air Force priorities is to ‘Develop exceptional leaders to lead the most powerful teams.’ In the case of removal of behaviors that promote toxic leadership, Air Force priorities are being implemented in 19 AF, by teaching new squadron commander to be active in the squadron and to mentor IPs and SPs by walking

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252 As mentioned in CDI Task 2A, the CDI team found that neither the DEOCS nor an equivalent instrument is routinely administered to students of training units in the command. As a consequence, unit DEOCS reports do not necessarily reflect the perceptions of students about the policies, practices, and procedures that would ensure a positive environment. Since subgroups within an organization can and often do have very different views of culture and climate, the DEOCS responses from students would have played heavily in our characterization of the culture of the units of interest, but was not measured.

253 Table 2.5 Trust in Leadership in the 47 FTW 2018 DEOMI Organizational Climate Survey (DEOCS) Report.
around and being approachable. That being said, there is room for improvement and growth.

Findings

Despite evidence of command exuding positive leadership characteristics lacking in toxicity, 19 AF leadership needs to better articulate to squadron leadership the organizational and environmental risk factors in formal flying training squadrons. For example, discussions about training our future aviators in a population of young Airmen that are of legal drinking age, living in locations with limited options for social engagement and the operationally intense environment where instructors and students work long hours. In the 2018 RAND Study, “Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment in the U.S. Military: Volume 5,” Vance, Laughlin, Altus and Columbus were estimated as the most at risk locations for sexual assault for women in all of the Air Force, in part for the factors mentioned above. Leaders in 19 AF need to take proactive measures to promote the Air Force culture of dignity and respect, celebrating our heritage of being a progressive service that leads all others in the promotion of diversity. Promoting and focusing on Air Force heritage will set the right preconditions for social events while de-emphasizing the overconsumption of alcohol.

In a resource and time constrained Air Force with an increased operations tempo, there were many bright spots within 19 AF that indicate leaders are promoting Air Force core values and promulgating ideals that embody dignity and respect, however, small pockets of incivility still exist, and if left unchecked or uncorrected could grow into a toxic training culture.
CDI TASK 2C

Assess the training culture and environment within the 47 FTW and across 19 AF to determine if it promotes a culture of dignity and respect. Specifically, assess if the chain of command failed to maintain a safe workplace.

Summary

Focus groups were asked to describe concerns for safety at social events and identify policies and practices used to ensure physical safety at social events. In sum, 60 students and 53 instructors answered the question. Responses primarily linked safety to alcohol consumption. Interviews overwhelmingly identified proactive Wingman concepts and designated driver measures were employed. It was perceived as acceptable to intervene when excessive drinking was observed.

Alcohol in the Formal Training Environment

In discussions about alcohol, Squadron and Flight Commanders identified a general culture of alcohol, but believed it was professional, moderate, and responsible. For example, Student Pilots (SP) and Instructor Pilots (IP) reported that alcohol consumption and interaction between SPs and IPs were closely monitored by Squadron and Flight Commanders and in accordance with AETCI 36-2909, Recruiting, Education, Accessions, and Training Standards of Conduct.
Yet in the discussion, two instructors felt pressured to drink and three believed Air Force leadership encouraged a culture of alcohol. Interviews revealed alcohol was not overtly emphasized; however, it was not dissuaded at Laughlin AFB, Sheppard AFB, Columbus AFB, or Vance AFB. Alcohol consumption at the end of the week in the flight or heritage rooms was verbalized as a nice tradition to relieve stress, foster esprit de corps, and camaraderie.

Participants identified family attendance at various Solo, Naming, Drop Night, Graduation and other miscellaneous morale events as a factor that caused social events to be safe and professional, by limiting the amount of alcohol consumed. Other participants used family member attendance as justification that these social events were safe and professional.

Enlisted focus groups did not have the same perception as wing leadership concerning alcohol consumption. Laughlin AFB was not perceived by the enlisted focus groups to have an alcohol culture that was professional, moderate, or responsible. Most felt officers drank more than enlisted personnel and characterized student pilots as frat boys. Perceptions existed that officers got away with misconduct associated with alcohol overindulgence.

**Reporting**

Groups were asked if they knew or heard of any situations that should have been reported but were not reported. Thirty-three students and forty-four instructors answered the question. All groups identified IP and SP fraternization was not tolerated at any location and universally stated Flight and Squadron Commanders had “open door” policies to address any issues. Personnel felt leaders were visible and actively participated in day-to-day activities.

Over half the respondents could not identify any observed behavior that warranted reporting. Students had a general knowledge of reporting and feedback options; however, several
were unfamiliar with anonymous feedback boxes. Fourteen respondents identified instances of either instructor-on-student or student-on-student harassment or unprofessional behavior. Very few students were comfortable reporting incidents beyond Flight Commander and only one student indicated they would not report anything until flying training was complete.

**Accountability**

Groups were asked to describe the willingness of Squadron and Flight Commanders, and Instructor Pilots, to hold instructors accountable for their behavior toward students. Sixty-nine students and thirty-four instructors answered the question. Both discussion and survey results identified personnel at all levels were comfortable reporting incidents and trusted commanders to hold people accountable.

Forty-three students revealed they had witnessed or been a part of aggressive IP instructional techniques. “Aggressive behavior” was described by students as yelling and/or forceful feedback during flights and debriefs. Multiple students identified they appreciated the various teaching techniques because it afforded them the ability to learn how to react to different personalities and it portrayed the populace they would encounter throughout their Air Force career. Several added that it was better to learn how they would react now versus in a combat environment. CSIs were singled out for the use of the most derogatory comments towards students.

Conversely, there were multiple students who preferred a calmer teaching/learning environment. They felt the more aggressive instruction caused them undo stress. On a positive note, students reported several instances where fellow IPs had corrected the aggressive teaching behavior. Additionally, students and IPs acknowledged Flight Commanders proactively worked to find personality matches between students and instructors.
Qualities of a Professional

Groups were asked to identify the top three qualities of a professional. Fifty-nine students and forty-nine instructors responded to the question. Aviator traits identified were similar amongst all groups interviewed. Positive traits identified included credible, knowledgeable, approachable, accessible, humble, ability to teach and learn, flexibility of instructional techniques, respect, and well-rounded person. Officer qualities outside the scope of stick and rudder skill were only somewhat addressed. Those traits were identified as honor, leadership, and accountability.

Finally, fourteen of fourteen Operations Group and Flying Training Squadron DEOCS reviewed verified focus group comments that personnel trusted leadership, believed they were treated as valued members in the organization, and were encouraged and empowered to use the chain of command to address concerns about discrimination without fear of retaliation or reprisal. Survey data addressed throughout this report also characterized their workplace environments as safe.

Analysis

In the context of training, a safe workplace extends beyond physical safety measures such as Crew Resource Management. Members must perceive themselves as safe from physical,
emotional and psychological harm. These second two sources of harm would be evident in a hostile environment or in which toxic leaders were left unaccountable, resulting in consequences to self-esteem and engagement in learning (Roland, 2013). Members feel safe in the absence of negative conditions, but also in the perception that 1) their chain of command would deal appropriately with negative conditions if they occur, and 2) the member him or herself would not experience any further harm from reporting a concern.\footnote{Reference Appendix H.}

Operational Risk Management (ORM) processes were very well institutionalized and an obvious, inherent part of every aspect of the flying training mission. Leaders, instructors, and students were acutely aware of risk management principles. Decisions to fly or not were deliberately determined though a collaborative effort. More importantly, interviews uniformly concurred decisions to not fly due to high-risk conditions were viewed as the right decision.

Overall, personnel identified the culture as professional and mission focused on producing aviators. Some interviews identified the AETC culture was one of innovation. A fighter culture was repeatedly used to describe T-38 and/or T-6 training and a mobility culture was often used to describe T-6 and/or T-1 training. No one identified the culture as toxic, hostile, or unsafe.

Although ORM and other practices are in place to keep students and instructors safe, the CDI team’s assessment was that many training milestones centered on alcohol consumption.
Institutionally, AETC endorses and empowers commanders with the authority to permit consumption of alcoholic beverages by all Airmen of age while in a formal training environment. Although not all alcohol consumption policies were reviewed, group discussions revealed each location has different policies to control alcohol consumption. JBSA-Randolph and Pensacola NAS locations had the strictest policies and there appeared to be less emphasis on drinking associated with training events.

While leadership did not actively encourage drinking, it was also not discouraged. Although the policy memorandums reviewed identified specific guidance on where to drink responsibly, they did not include guidance that “use of alcohol must not adversely affect your duty performance or your conduct on or off-duty.”²⁵⁶ The relatively remote locations of some of the pilot training bases, coupled with a younger demographic, are contributing factors to the glamorization of a drinking culture.

Findings

The chain of command maintained a safe work environment where Airmen could report negative conditions without reprisal. Risk management techniques were firmly embedded in the mission. Although instructor training techniques varied and despite some concerns at Laughlin AFB, students characterized the environment as professional. Deliberate efforts by instructors and flight commanders to adjust

training to meet student learning needs were encouraging. Wing leadership and commanders at all levels were taking proactive measures to treat women with dignity and respect. The consumption of alcohol in association with training milestones appeared to glamorize the overindulgence of alcohol and this was most notable at Laughlin AFB.
Assess whether the two officers identified given their disciplinary history, should have been assigned as AETC instructor pilots at all. Determine whether prior processes are in place to assess the prior disciplinary history of AETC instructors before assignment to the command.

Overview

The three officers discussed in the Background section each had no disciplinary history, but, looking through the lens of officership instead of criminality, the Air Force had records of previous alcohol related incidents, misuse of subordinates, risky personnel behavior and questionable officership. Their disciplinary history alone would not have prevented them from being assigned as AETC instructor pilots, however, an officer’s discipline history does not tell the entire story of an officer’s character. A review of their history of conduct, as found in AMJAMS, may have triggered further scrutiny by losing and gaining commanders. AETC does not have a unified baseline process or minimum standard for instructors assigned to AETC. Furthermore, 19 AF was not involved in the process of vetting the ability, affinity and professionalism of pilots selected for instructor duty.

Assignment Process

The Air Force assignment process is managed by the Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC) and follows the Air Force Officer Assignment System (AFOAS) Personnel Services Delivery (PSD) Guide. This guide outlines the processes and procedures for the AFOAS and it addresses assignment philosophy, as well as responsibilities of officers, commanders, and officer assignment
teams (OATs). The AFOAS guide states that it “seeks to balance assignment actions amongst Air Force requirements, Officer Professional Development (OPD), and officer preferences/commander recommendations,” and also states “the Air Force will optimize its ability to place the right officers into the right jobs at the right time.”

AETC/A3 determines the number of flying training instructor billets for each fiscal year based on required student production. This includes billets for AETC Instructor Pilots (IPs), Instructor Combat Systems Officers (ICSOs) and undergraduate Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) Training (URT) Instructors. AFPC OATs distribute the flying training “bill” to the operational wings. The OATs distribute the billets that need to be filled across the wings in their respective categories (i.e., Mobility, SOF, CSAR, etc.). Wing commanders decide who will fill the billets and provide the OATs with soft matches.

For these soft matches, losing commanders are expected to ensure that pilots selected for AETC assignments meet the minimum requirements outlined in Education and Training Course Announcements (ETCA). Part of the ETCA mandates, “SQ/CC and OG/CC must also attest to the officer’s professional qualities and character to serve as a proper role model and mentor to the next generation of AF officers.” Wings may submit a waiver to 19AF if any criteria is not met. The OAT reviews the selected officer’s record to ensure they have the required Time on Station (TOS) to move and they do not have negative Quality of Force (QoF) indicators, to include an Unfavorable Information File (UIF) or a control roster (cannot move).
This is the only QoF check done on future instructor pilots before being formally matched to an assignment in AETC.

The AFPC Trainer Assignments Officer then allocates the Pilot Instructor Training (PIT) slots required for the assignment and releases the assignment notification. For an officer to actually get their orders, they must comply with the officer Personnel Processing Codes (PPCs). For an AETC flying training unit, the PPC includes the previously mentioned ETCA requirement for losing commanders to certify that the officer meets the minimum requirements, but this time in writing. Specifically, for assignments as an AETC IP, ICSO or URT instructor, the PPC states: “A memorandum indicating the individual meets the ETCA flying eligibility requirements must be received by the MPF processing the assignment and must be signed by the member, the member's commander, and the member's OG/CC (or equivalent). The SQ/CC and OG/CC must also attest to the officer’s professional qualities and character to serve as a proper role model and mentor to the next generation of AF officers. This memorandum must be received by the MPF no later than 60 days prior to projected departure date for the training/assignment.”

This is the second time during the selection and assignment process squadron and group commanders are expected to affirm the skill and professionalism of pilots they send to AETC, underlying the importance of ensuring high caliber officers are assigned to instructional duty.

If the losing commander is unwilling to sign this memo, then the assignment is cancelled and the losing wing is expected to fill the unfilled billet, or the billet goes unfilled until the next
assignment cycle. After the memo is signed, it does not leave the losing base and is only required for the officer to receive orders. The gaining unit and/or 19AF do not receive verification that this memo was signed beyond the assumption the requirement was complied with if an officer receives their orders.

Analysis

While AFPC’s philosophy is to get the right officers, into the right jobs, at the right time, a review of the Automated Military Justice Analysis and Management System (AMJAMS) and disciplinary history of Instructor Pilots currently assigned to AETC initial flying training revealed there are shortfalls in ensuring the right officers are selected. By looking at an alleged misconduct snapshot on 23 August 2018, for 959 line IPs (IPs whose primary job is instructing) in white jets (initial training) across six pilot training bases revealed 65 IPs (6.8%) had at least one entry for disciplinary history in AMJAMS. Ten IPs had multiple AMJAMS entries over the course of their Air Force careers (1%). Five of the 10 pilots with multiple entries in AMJAMS are currently stationed at Laughlin AFB. Twenty-one of the IPs with entries in AMJAMS are currently stationed at Laughlin AFB, 13 are stationed at Columbus AFB, 13 at JBSA-Randolph, 8 at Vance AFB, 6 at Sheppard AFB, and 4 at Pensacola NAS. The 65 identified IPs had a combined 78 total cases/incidents, with 109 total UCMJ charges. Of these cases, 6 investigations with 10 total UCMJ charges are still open (3 of these cases are open at the 47 FTW, Laughlin AFB).

257 AFI 51-201, Administration of Military Justice, outlines the requirements for creating “Special Interest Reports” (SIRs): “Regardless of offense, report all allegations and investigations involving officers, CMSgts, and SMSgts.” AMJAMS is used to generate the SIR, “which should include case details, including alleged offenses, dates, and locations, UCMJ articles and specifications, media interest, investigating agency, next steps, and any unusual or significant features of the case” (paragraph 13.3).
Of the 78 cases of alleged IP misconduct, 14% resulted in no administrative, NJP or court-martial action (or the final disposition is unknown).
The top 5 categories of alleged misconduct, by infractions (or UCMJ charge) were: 1) dereliction of duty, 2) DUI, 3) drunk and disorderly, 4) conduct unbecoming, and 5) assault/battery (there are 23 total infraction categories). The top 5 categories account for 70% of the charged infractions. Of the 99 total UCMJ infractions, 41 involved alcohol. Of the 78 total incidents, 26 occurred in their current assignments as instructor pilots with 39 total UCMJ specifications.

In the three cases of IP alleged misconduct at Laughlin AFB, two of the individuals had information in AMJAMS that may have prevented their assignment to Laughlin, or would have
warranted further scrutiny. In one case, the member was court martialed for an alcohol incident that included aggravated assault and, in the other, the IP was accused of sexual misconduct on diverse occasions. None of the charges resulted in administrative actions or NJP for either case. While assigned to Laughlin AFB, the IP who was previously court-martialed had an alcohol incident and received administrative action for a DUI. Furthermore, the IP who was previously accused of sexual misconduct received administrative action, while assigned to Laughlin AFB, for gender-based harassment for using vulgar terms and discriminatory language when talking to a student pilot. In both cases, information in AMJAMS were indicators of character.

Further analysis of information in AMJAMS across all initial flying training units reveals multiple cases where an IP received administrative action prior to their current AETC IP assignment that would have been an indication of the quality of their character. Knowledge of these incidents would have likely prevented the IP from being assigned as an AETC instructor pilot (e.g., substantiated fraternization and repeated alcohol incidents).

It is important to note AMJAMS is a Judge Advocate case management tool and not an official repository for substantiated misconduct against Air Force members. While all known allegations of misconduct by officers are required to be input by the servicing legal office into AMJAMS, there is no requirement for commanders to report all allegations of officer misconduct to the legal office. In short, the data in AMJAMS is only as good as the information entered into the system. It may provide an incomplete picture of the allegations and case resolution; requiring commanders to seek out additional sources of information like reports of investigation, CDIs, previous commanders or supervisors and, within AETC, the officer’s PIF. While this issue will likely be addressed by the Automated Case Tracking System (ACTS), currently, learning the

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258 AFI 90-301, Inspection General Complaints Resolution. ACTS is an USAF IG data system that serves as the central point to compile, process and analyze complaints.
underlying facts of an allegation addressed through administrative actions (or no action at all) is difficult to discern without deeper investigation. Nevertheless, a background search within AMJAMS does allow a commander a quick tool to look into possible previous misconduct. If it is found, they can work with their legal office to determine the final disposition of the case as a means to help build a picture of the whole officer. This information should not be used in a vacuum to make a wholesale judgment on the caliber of an officer; rather, it should be used as a data point(s) in conjunction with other relevant information.

The need for more intense scrutiny for formal training instructors is a familiar lesson for AETC. In the wake of the Basic Military Training scandal in 2012, the Command recognized the importance of setting a minimum standard for Military Training Instructor (MTI) selection to include an assessment of their demonstrated leadership ability, a review of the disciplinary history, and a commander’s recommendation, which includes an assessment of the applicant’s leadership and supervisory skills. Furthermore, they recognized that the gaining unit could be the waiver authority for deviations from these criteria and could be an active part of the vetting process; which would be unique for AETC instructor assignments. The benefit of this approach was the ability to hold losing commanders accountable for pushing (or off-loading) unsuitable candidates to the formal training environment.

After officer misconduct was uncovered at Laughlin AFB in 2014, AETC relearned the importance of increased oversight for instructor assignments. AETC A/2/3/10 chartered the Flying
Training Culture Working Group to conduct an assessment of flying training for gaps in leadership, institutional safeguards, and culture, specifically as it related to unprofessional relationships and larger issues of officership and professionalism.\textsuperscript{259} Recommendation 5 from this report articulated minimum instructor requirements and insisted on commander endorsement. The report stated, “if officership, mentorship, and professional development are to be an important component for instructing during SUPT, or MDS flying training, it is important that we select the right personnel as well as articulate that component of the expectation.” AETC technically adhered to the recommendation in that it created a minimum instructor requirement by implementing a process for commander endorsement before assignment to AETC; nevertheless this process has shortcomings and the current requirement for vetting AETC instructor pilots is insufficient.

The process falls short of the level of scrutiny required to ensure instructors in the training environment have the strength of character needed to successfully lead, coach, and mentor in a power-disparate, high-risk environment. It does not require the losing commander to conduct an inquiry into previous misconduct or assess their affinity for instructor duty in order to make a determination if they are suitable to shape future Air Force aviators. Concerning two of the IPs highlighted in this report, CDI interviews highlighted a common belief that both pilots’ MDS communities (C-17 and B-52) downloaded their problems to the pilot training community. In one case, squadron leadership conveyed they were aware that an offending IP was deficient in both skill and character prior to being assigned to AETC.\textsuperscript{260} In this case, a deeper review of the pilot’s record, an assessment of professional attributes, and a look into discipline history may have prevented this officer from being assigned to the formal training environment.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{259} See Appendix J.
\item \textsuperscript{260} This was the opinion of an FGO, in a leadership position, assigned to the pilot’s unit at Laughlin AFB who received multiple points of feedback from other pilots who had previously been assigned with the offending instructor.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
This is not new protocol for AETC. Across the command, there are well-established vetting mechanisms in place to ensure the right quality of professional is placed in the training and education environment. For enlisted special duties, the Developmental Special Duty (DSD) Nomination and Selection Program requires Airman nominated for a DSD position to be highly qualified and to be an ambassador and role model for Air Force core values and discipline. As part of the vetting process for Military Training Leaders (MTLs), a candidate must complete the 2 AF Military Training Leader Application, which includes a look at previous EPRs, fitness history, a review of their AMJAMS history and psychological screening. For psychological screening, 2 AF uses Shipley test and a stress test (PHQ-9, BDI or OQ-45) depending on what is available at each candidates’ location. Military Training Instructors (MTIs) undergo intense scrutiny before assignment to Basic Military Training (BMT). In addition to a review of disciplinary history, fitness suitability, and record of performance, MTIs must undergo a 360 degree assessment from superiors, subordinates and peers, and multiple psychological assessments (through surveys and interviews).

On the officer side, the hiring mechanism for ROTC assignments is a better example of instructor vetting. Rather than the OAT allocating empty billets to wings to fill at their discretion, each candidate must submit an application for open positions that includes their last five OPRs, fitness assessments, official photo, transcripts, and a cover letter. Most importantly, the hiring decision rests with the gaining unit rather than a fait accompli from AFPC.

There is a new focus on the importance of AETC instructor duty as a milestone in an Airman’s career. In the VCSAF 2018 Force Development Guidance memorandum for functional managers and development team chairs, one of the five stated lines of effort of the Development Teams (DTs) is vectoring the top 25% of targeted population to fill Force Generation requirements
directly responsible for training, educating and developing our Airmen. This memo establishes a clear expectation that only top tier Airmen should be sent to AETC as instructors. However, until there is policy from HAF, APFC or AETC that executes the VCSAF’s intent, the desired outcome is unlikely to be achieved.

Findings

The three officers discussed in this report had no disciplinary history, but, looking through the lens of officer ship instead of criminality, the Air Force was on notice of previous alcohol related incidents, misuse of subordinates, risky personnel behavior and questionable officership. Their disciplinary history alone would not have prevented them from being assigned as AETC instructor pilots. A review of their history of conduct, as found in AMJAMS, may have triggered further scrutiny by losing and gaining commanders. Regarding two of the three officers, a review of AMJAMS data would have highlighted previous investigated infractions leading the losing commander to take a deeper look at the officer’s history. This may have informed their commander’s decision to sign a memo that attested to the “officer’s professional qualities and character to serve as a proper role model and mentor.” Furthermore, AETC does not have a unified baseline process or minimum standard for all instructors assigned to AETC. It is left to each
educational or training enterprise to develop a unique process, leaving gaps in some enterprise’s selection process (i.e. flying training). Finally, AETC does not have a stated “red line” for misconduct that would result in the permanent removal of an instructor. An officer of questionable character is allowed to remain in the flying training community, and impact the technical and professional development of our officers.
RECOMMENDATIONS

Organizational and Training Culture

Recommendation 1: Establish and promote a shared culture within all AETC flying training units.

Recommendation 2: AETC should evaluate the association of alcohol with key syllabus milestones and class performance during formal flying training courses. The evaluation should scrutinize practices that encourage or condone overindulgence of alcohol and/or binge drinking.

Recommendation 3: The Air Force should invest in Quality of Life programs and facilities at Laughlin AFB (e.g. dining facility, medical treatment at Laughlin AFB vice San Antonio, etc.).

Recommendation 4: Create embedding mechanisms within the Pilot Instructor Training syllabus and other foundational documents that allow time and space, placing emphasis on various methods of education and coaching.\(^{261}\)

Recommendation 5: Determine if current flying training wing student gifting, traditionally associated with flying milestones, conforms to Joint Ethics Regulation.

Leadership Environment and Oversight

Recommendation 6: Develop exceptional leaders through a formalized flight commander course led by the Wing Commander (chaired by an O-6), tailored for the local mission, and targeted at

\(^{261}\) Recommendation has similarities to 2014 Flying Training Culture Working Group Recommendation 2: Capture and articulate the value of heritage, professionalism, and informal mentorship. Also, Recommendation13: Develop bold commanders by expecting leadership over incidental outcomes. See Appendix J.
Recommendation 7: Develop scenario-based education within existing leadership courses to expand commander’s knowledge on the use and applicability of medical and non-medical counseling and helping services available to Airmen and their families.

Recommendation 8: Flying commanders in AETC should complete requalification or initial instructor training prior to taking command. Exception to policy must be approved by the AETC/CC with corresponding unit duties turned over to appropriate deputies or vice commanders until training is completed.

Barriers to Reporting by Students and Instructors

Recommendation 9: AETC should develop an anonymous feedback/reporting tool for all training environments. This tool should be easily accessible, well-publicized and encouraged.

Recommendation 10: Standardize mid-course anonymous feedback for instructors, students, and flight commanders within 19 AF flying training squadrons.

Recommendation 11: Expand how AETC personnel are taught on AFI 36-2909 regarding appropriate relationships, including discussions on fostering positive professional relationships which reinforce education and coaching vice just prohibitions.

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262 Recommendation has similarities to 2014 Flying Training Culture Working Group Recommendation 12: Enhance squadron commander and flight commander training to emphasize development of professionals. See Appendix J.

263 Recommendation has similarities to 2014 Flying Training Culture Working Group Recommendation 8: Enhance the availability of anonymous reporting. See Appendix J.
Institutional Policies and Safeguards

Recommendation 12: AETC should investigate the environment created and influenced by Civilian Simulator Instructors (CSI) in flying training units.

Recommendation 13: Most at risk locations for sexual assault and harassment in 19 AF need to re-emphasize the organizational or environmental risk factors for sexual assault and harassment and develop specialized training, prevention, and response interventions that focus on the inherent responsibility for Air Force members to adhere to higher standards than those expected in civilian life.

Recommendation 14: 19 AF should establish a process to ensure AETC flying instructors possess the suitable character and technical skills for instructor duty, to include the record of performance, flight evaluation folder, history of conduct (via Automated Military Justice Analysis and Management System, Automated Case Tracking System, or other sources) and assess the feasibility of incorporating 2 AF’s psychological screening process.\textsuperscript{264}

Recommendation 15: AETC should establish a red line for the removal of instructors who are determined to possess an unsuitable character or technical skills for the training environment.

Recommendation 16: Reexamine the AETC “right of first refusal” policy to determine if its practice is compatible with prohibitions on Unlawful Command Influence.

Recommendation 17: Reexamine the withhold policies at the MAJCOM, NAF, and Wing levels to determine if they detract from a squadron commander’s ability to maintain good order and discipline within their unit.

\textsuperscript{264} Recommendation has similarities to 2014 Flying Training Culture Working Group Recommendation 5: Articulate minimum instructor requirements and insist on CC endorsement. See Appendix J.
Recommendation 18: Level disciplinary actions for officer and enlisted members.

Recommendation 19: AETC and AFPC should implement the VCSAF 2018 Force Development Guidance Memorandum stated expectation that the top 25% of targeted population should fill Force Generation requirements.
**Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Treatment:** A program designed to promote readiness, health and wellness through the prevention, evaluation and treatment of substance misuse and abuse; to minimize the negative consequences of substance misuse and abuse, to the individual, family, and organization; to provide comprehensive education and treatment to individuals who experience problems attributed to substance misuse or abuse; and to restore function and return members to unrestricted duty status, or to assist them in their transition to civilian life, as appropriate. (AFI 44-121, *Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Treatment (ADAPT) Program*, 18 July 2018, paragraph 3.4.1.)

**At-Risk or Hazardous Alcohol Use:** The consumption of alcohol in daily or weekly amounts greater than those defined as safe by the US Preventive Task Force. Drinking at levels above the recommended amounts places an individual at greater risk for illness, injury, or social or legal problems. (DoDI 1010.04, *Problematic Substance Use by DoD Personnel*, 20 February 2014, Part II, Definitions)

**Behavioral Health Care Facilitator (BHCF):** A registered nurse (alternatively, a licensed vocational nurse, medical technician, licensed mental health counselor, psychologist, social worker, or psychiatric nurse practitioner) delivering services in a care management model of service delivery. (DoDI 6490.15, *Integration of Behavioral Health Personnel (BHP) Services Into Patient-Centered Medical Home (PCMH) Primary Care and Other Primary Care Service Settings*, 20 November 2014, Part II Definitions)

**Belittle:** To make someone or something seem unimportant. (Oxford On-line Dictionary)

**Bullying:** Abuse and mistreatment of someone vulnerable by someone stronger, more powerful, etc. (https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bullying) The abuse and mistreatment is generally targeted at a person (or group) who is seen as different through acts of aggression, abusive or malicious pranks, active attempts to damage reputation, physical harm, and/or psychological harm.
Care Management Model: A population-based model of care focused on a discrete clinical problem (e.g., depression). It incorporates specific pathways using a variety of components that systematically and comprehensively address how behavioral health problems are managed in the primary care setting. Primary Care Managers (PCMs) and Behavioral Health Care Facilitators (BHCFs) share information regarding patients and there is a shared medical record, treatment plan, and standard of care. Typically, there is some form of systematic interface with specialty care (e.g., weekly case review and treatment change recommendations). (DoDI 6490.15, Integration of Behavioral Health Personnel (BHP) Services Into Patient-Centered Medical Home (PCMH) Primary Care and Other Primary Care Service Settings, 20 November 2014, Part II Definitions)

Commander: Any commissioned officer who exercises command authority over a Service member. The term includes a military member designated in accordance with this instruction to carry out any activity of a commander under this instruction. (DoDI 6490.04, Mental Health Evaluations of Members of the Military Services, 4 March 2013, Part II Definitions)

Community Action Information Board (CAIB): A Commander's tool which allows the Commander to assess the health of the community and to enact positive programs and services to foster resiliency. This forum is built on a holistic Comprehensive Airman Fitness (CAF) framework using mental, physical, social and spiritual pillars to focus the community action programs thus developing a resilient AF culture. (AFI 90-501, Community Action Information Board (CAIB) and Integrated Delivery System (IDS), 14 August 2014, Paragraph 1).

Commander-Directed Evaluation (CDE): A Mental Health Evaluation (MHE) ordered by a commander or supervisor. (DoDI 6490.04, Mental Health Evaluations of Members of the Military Services, 4 March 2013, Part II Definitions)

Culture: It is the set of shared attitudes, values, goals, and practices that characterizes an institution or organization. It also can be defined as the set of values, conventions, or social practices associated with a particular field, activity, or societal characteristic (i.e. culture of dignity and respect). (Merriam-Webster Dictionary https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/culture.)
**Culture of Dignity and Respect:** This cultural change was called for by then Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel in response to a sexual assault allegation. He called for a cultural change where “every service member is treated with dignity and respect, where all allegations of inappropriate behavior are treated with seriousness, where victims' privacy is protected, where bystanders are motivated to intervene and where offenders know that they will be held accountable by strong and effective systems of justice.” This charge is repeated in AFI 90-6001, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response, stating “Airmen will strive to eliminate sexual assault by fostering a culture of dignity and mutual respect among Air Force members and provide environments free of sexual harassment and assault.” (AFI 90-6001, *Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program*, 21 May 2015, Incorporating Change 1, 18 March 2016)

**Harassment:** Behavior that is unwelcome or offensive to a reasonable person, whether oral, written, or physical, that creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment. It can occur through electronic communications, including social media, other forms of communication, and in person. It may include offensive jokes, epithets, ridicule or mockery, insults or put-downs, displays of offensive objects or imagery, stereotyping, intimidating acts, veiled threats of violence, threatening or provoking remarks, racial or other slurs, derogatory remarks about a person’s accent, or displays of racially offensive symbols. (DoD Instruction 1020.03, *Harassment Prevention and Response in the Armed Forces*, 8 February 2018, para. 3.1)

**Hazing:** A form of harassment that includes conduct through which Service members or DoD employees, without a proper military or other governmental purpose, but with a nexus to military Service, physically or psychologically injures or creates a risk of physical or psychological injury to Service members for the purpose of: initiation into, admission into, affiliation with, change in status or position within, or a condition for continued membership in any military or DoD civilian organization. (DoD Instruction 1020.03, *Harassment Prevention and Response in the Armed Forces*, 8 February 2018, para. 3.5)

**High Interest List (HIL):** When a provider considers a patient (Service members, retirees and military dependents) to be a serious risk for harming themselves or others, the patient is placed on the
Humiliate: To make (someone) feel ashamed and foolish by injuring their dignity and self-respect, especially publicly. (English Oxford Living Dictionaries, see https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/humiliate)

Hostile: Unfriendly; antagonistic; having an intimidating, antagonistic, or offensive nature (Merriam-Webster Dictionary, see https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/hostile).

Hostile Work Environment:
Hostile Work Environment is a phrase used in United States labor law to describe an environment in which a member finds it difficult or impossible to work due to discriminatory conditions. US (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), see https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/harassment.cfm, 2018).

Integrated Delivery System: Functions as the action arm of the CAIB and develops a comprehensive, coordinated plan for integrating and implementing community outreach and prevention programs (e.g., financial, relationship, family maltreatment, sexual assault, equal opportunity, suicide prevention, substance abuse, health promotion, tobacco cessation, etc.), with the goal of enhancing resilience in military communities. (AFI 90-501, Community Action Information Board (CAIB) and Integrated Delivery System (IDS), 14 August 2014, Paragraph 1).

Internal Behavioral Health Consultant (IBHC): A psychologist, social worker, psychiatric nurse practitioner, or psychiatrist credentialed for independent practice or a psychology, social work, psychiatric nurse practitioner or psychiatric trainee being clinically supervised by a behavioral health provider who is credentialed for independent practice. IBHCs work in a PCBH model of service delivery. (DoDI 6490.15, Integration of Behavioral Health Personnel (BHP) Services Into Patient-Centered Medical Home (PCMH) Primary Care and Other Primary Care Service Settings, 20 Nov 14, Part II Definitions)

Leadership: Influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation while operating to
accomplish the mission and improving the organization. A leader is anyone who by virtue of
assumed role or assigned responsibility inspires and influences people to accomplish

Limited Privilege Suicide Prevention Program (LPSP): Air Force members enrolled in the LPSP
program are granted limited protection with regard to information revealed in, or generated by
their clinical relationship with MHPs IAW AFI 44-172, Mental Health, and AFI 44-109, Mental
Health and Military Law. Such information may not be used in the existing or any future UCMJ
action or when weighing characterization of service in a separation. Commanders or persons acting
under their authority, such as staff judge advocates, squadron executive officers, or first sergeants,
may use the information for any other purposes authorized by law, this instruction, and other Air
Force instructions and programs. (AFI90-505_AFGM2018-01, Air Force Guidance Memorandum
to Air Force Instruction (AFI) 90-505, Suicide Prevention Program 8 June 2018, Terms)

Mental Health Evaluation (MHE): A psychiatric examination or evaluation, a psychological
examination or evaluation, an examination for psychiatric or psychological fitness for duty, or any
other means of assessing the mental health of a Service member. (DoDI 6490.04, Mental Health
Evaluations of Members of the Military Services, 4 March 13, Part II Definitions)

Mental Health Provider (MHP): A psychiatrist or clinical psychologist, a person with a doctorate in
clinical social work, or a psychiatric nurse practitioner. In cases of outpatient mental health
evaluations only, licensed clinical social workers who possess a master’s degree in clinical social
work will also be considered MHPs. (DoDI 6490.04, Mental Health Evaluations of Members of
the Military Services, 4 March 2013, Part II Definitions)

Military and Family Life Counselor: A licensed clinical counselor that provides short-term,
confidential non-medical counseling services to military service members and their families to
address the challenges presented through the military lifestyle and provide positive coping skills
in order to thrive despite these challenges. (MHN Government Services, Programs & Services,
https://www.mhngs.com/app/programsandservices/mflc_program.content)
Mistreatment: To treat (a person or animal) badly, cruelly, or unfairly. Oxford Online Dictionary, see https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/mistreat

Patient Centered Medical Home (PCMH): A team-based model of primary care service delivery, led by a Primary Care Manager, which provides continuous, accessible, family-centered, comprehensive, compassionate, and culturally-sensitive health care in order to achieve the best outcomes. The model is based on the concept that the best healthcare has a strong primary care foundation with quality and resource efficiency incentives. The PCMH focuses on providing or arranging for all the patient’s health care needs for all stages of life to include, acute care, chronic care, preventive services, and end of life care. A PCMH practice is responsible for all of a patient’s healthcare needs and for coordinating or integrating specialty healthcare and other professional services. (DoDI 6490.15, Integration of Behavioral Health Personnel (BHP) Services Into Patient-Centered Medical Home (PCMH) Primary Care and Other Primary Care Service Settings, 20 Nov 14, Part II Definitions)

Preponderance of Evidence: A preponderance of the evidence means simply the greater weight of credible evidence. AFI 36-2907, Unfavorable Information Files, paragraph 4.1.3. Proof “by a preponderance of the evidence” is proof that a fact is more likely true than not true. Under a preponderance of the evidence standard regarding two conflicting possibilities, a fact finder need only determine which of the two possibilities is more likely, given the evidence. (See United States v. Prather, 69 M.J. 338, 346 (C.A.A.F. 2011))

Primary Care Behavioral Health (PCBH) Model: A population health-based model of care focused on all patient populations, where the medical and behavioral health providers share information regarding patients and there is a shared medical record, treatment plan, and standard of care. The behavioral health provider is embedded with the primary care team and serves as a consultant and co-implementer with the PCM in the assessment, intervention and health care management of the patient. Consistent with a consultation model, the IBHC operates within a scope of practice and a standard of care that is consistent with primary care and differs from the scope of practice and standard of care in a specialty outpatient mental health clinic. (DoDI 6490.15, Integration of Behavioral Health Personnel (BHP) Services Into Patient-Centered Medical Home (PCMH)
Primary Care Manager (PCM): A healthcare provider who is responsible for providing all routine, non-emergency, and urgent health care for patients within a healthcare system, and coordinates/refers other specialist care the patient may need. (TRICARE.mil website)

Psychoeducation: The use of information or training that is intended to increase awareness or improve skills of persons with a psychological disturbance. (DoDI 1010.04, Problematic Substance Use by DoD Personnel, 20 February 2014, Part II Definitions)

Sexual Harassment: A form of sex discrimination that involves unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature when:
(1) Submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of a person's job, pay, or career, or (2) Submission to or rejection of such conduct by a person is used as a basis for career or employment decisions affecting that person, or (3) Such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment. This definition emphasizes that workplace conduct, to be actionable as "abusive work environment" harassment, need not result in concrete psychological harm to the victim, but rather need only be so severe or pervasive that a reasonable person would perceive, and the victim does perceive, the work environment as hostile or offensive. "Workplace" is an expansive term for Military members and may include conduct on or off duty, 24 hours a day. Any person in a supervisory or command position who uses or condones any form of sexual behavior to control, influence, or affect the career, pay, or job of a Military member or civilian employee is engaging in sexual harassment. Similarly, any Military member or civilian employee who makes deliberate or repeated unwelcome verbal comments, gestures, or physical contact of a sexual nature in the workplace is also engaging in sexual harassment. (DoDI 1350.2, Department of Defense Military Equal Opportunity (MEO) Program, Enclosure 2. Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Also see AFI 36-2706, Equal Opportunity Program, Military and Civilian, 5 October 2017).

Sex-Based Harassment (or Sex Discrimination): Sex-based harassment focuses on gender more than

**Suicide Attempt:** Any nonfatal, self-directed, potentially injurious behavior accompanied by evidence of intent to die which as a result of the behavior, results in medical care/treatment (including mental health care) or evacuation from the AOR. A suicide attempt may or may not result in injury. (AFI90-505_AFGM2018-01, Air Force Guidance Memorandum to Air Force Instruction (AFI 90-505, Suicide Prevention Program 8 June 2018, Terms)

**Supervisor:** A commissioned officer within or out of a Service member’s official chain of command, or civilian employee in a grade level comparable to a commissioned officer, who: exercises supervisory authority over the Service member owing to the Service member’s current or temporary duty assignment or other circumstances of the Service member’s duty assignment; and is authorized due to the impracticality of involving an actual commanding officer in the member’s chain of command to direct a Mental Health Evaluation. (DoDI 6490.04, Mental Health Evaluations of Members of the Military Services, 4 Mar 13, Part II Definitions)

**Toxic Leader:** There is no official definition of this term. It is most often defined by listing character traits or effects. According to an Army War College paper in 2005, it is a leader who take part in destructive behaviors and show signs of dysfunctional personal characteristics having poisonous effects that cause serious harm to their organizations and their followers. Another definition, found in an Army War College paper in 2012, elaborates that it is leaders who (1) show an apparent lack of concern for the well-being of subordinates; (2) whose personality or interpersonal technique negatively affects the organizational climate and (3) they are viewed as being motivated primarily
by self-interest "designed to advance them over the carcasses of their subordinates." (Toxic Leadership In The U.S. Army, Research Paper, Col Denise Williams, 10 Jan 05 see http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/ksil3.pdf; Toxic Leadership in the Military Profession, Research Paper, Col John Box, 2012, see http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army-usawc/box_toxic_leadership.pdf with three part test attributed to Col (Ret) George E. Reed of the University of San Diego’s School of Leadership and Education Sciences).

*Unlawful Command Influence (UCI):* The improper use, or perception of use of superior authority to interfere with the court-martial process. (AFI 51-201, *Administration of Military Justice*, 8 December 2017, para. 1.3).

*Unlawful Discrimination:* Includes discrimination on the basis of color, national origin, race, religion, or sex that is not otherwise authorized by law or regulation (DoDD 1350.2, *Department of Defense Military Equal Opportunity (MEO) Program*, 18 August 1995, para 4.2).
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